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AFFILIATIONS, SALES, AND CONVERSIONS





Whether taxable or exempt from taxation, all businesses, charities, and
even governmental organizations, strive to make a profit. However, the social
and legal distinctions between non-profit and for-profit organizations are very
real and embedded in centuries of law and tradition. Charities have provided for
the care and treatment of the sick and injured since at least the inception of this
branch of Anglo-American law in 1601 with enactment of the Statute of Chari-
table Uses.' Healthcare in the United States is now a trillion dollar industry
dominating no less than 14% of gross domestic product.2 As the art and sci-
ence of medical treatment have become more expensive and complex, it is only
natural that healthcare organizations have taken on more of the attributes of
their for-profit cousins, including the need to merge, sell out, affiliate, or other-
wise restructure in ways designed to meet the challenges of a dynamic market.3
Until the 1980's there was little occasion to examine the issues raised by
creative and aggressive capital enhancement transactions involving non-profit
charities. However, as investment dollars have flooded into the healthcare mar-
ket, traditionally a non-profit economic sector, law and policy governing the
relationship between these organizations has taken shape in a nearly frenetic
* Based on remarks delivered at the Symposium, Legal Issues for Nonprofits, at the University of
Tulsa College of Law, October 28, 1997.
t The author is a shareholder in the Tulsa, Oklahoma law firm of Boone, Smith, Davis, Hurst &
Dickman and practices primarily in the area of general business transactions with a recent concentration in
health. J.D. 1975, The University of Texas at Austin.
1. An Act to Redress the Misemployment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money Theretofore Given to
Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch.4 (Eng.).
2. See Healthcare Crisis: Quest for Efficiency (visited Jan. 21, 1998) <http://www.cicrad.com/2.html>.
3. From 1994 to 1996 an estimated 140 hospitals converted from non-profit to for-profit status. See
Harris Meyer, A Lot Is Not Enough, HosPrrALs AND HEALTH NETwoRKs, Oct. 20, 1997, at 30. The number
of partnerships and other joint ventures between profit and non-profit organizations is impossible to calculate.
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environment of legislation, regulation, litigation, and public scrutiny. These
transactions are only beginning to surface in Oklahoma.
To understand the issues and successfully advise organizations through the
process, it is necessary to explore the reasons for non-profit and for-profit affili-
ations, sales, and conversions (Part I); the forms, levels, and varieties of such
affiliations (Part I); the limitations imposed by tax law and the constraints
arising from state enforcement of common law and statutory proscriptions (Part
IV); and the trend towards such affiliations in the Oklahoma governmental
public sector (Part V). In conclusion, the author suggests that Oklahoma's rather
restrained regulatory environment provides a good opportunity for the responsi-
ble enhancement of this vital economic sector for the improvement of
healthcare delivery.
1. REASONS FOR AFFILIATIONS, SALES, AND CONVERSIONS
A. The Purposes and Objectives of Non-Profit and For-Profit Healthcare
Organizations are Substantially Similar
All organizations are inhibited by some federal, state, and local regulations
restraining their operations. Non-profit organizations, whether desiring tax ex-
emption or otherwise, have additional constraints with which to contend. In
addition to its primary objective (e.g., making and selling goods or providing
services) a for-profit enterprise exists to earn profits for its owners and inves-
tors. The non-profit enterprise exists to provide its goods and services with no
return on equity investment. The non-profit must be operated exclusively in
furtherance of its charitable mission. Charity, quite broadly, includes the entire
spectrum of activities designed to improve quality of life through improving the
arts, education, welfare, and health.'
Many factors-both economic and strategic-have blurred the distinctions
between for-profit and non-profit healthcare providers. First, the nature, size,
and scope of services of such providers are virtually the same. For example,
Columbia/HCA, Inc., the largest American hospital corporation, consists of
subsidiaries and divisions which are virtually indistinguishable from either
stand-alone 501(c)(3)' facilities or religious affiliated entities. Second, state-of-
the-art medical services are or should be virtually identical regardless of the
underlying form of business organization. This is, in part, no doubt the result of
a malpractice environment which no longer favors charitable organizations.6
Third, the public mission of for-profit institutions-to treat the sick and in-
4. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) [hereinafter 501(c)(3)]. Section 501(c)(3) exempts organizations from
taxation which provide "[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged... [and those entities
engaged in] lessening ... the burdens of Government... and promotion of social welfare." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1960). Promotion of health for the benefit of the community is a recognized charitable
purpose. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. These terms are broadly interpreted and allow great flexibili-
ty.
5. See supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Gable v. Salvation Army, 100 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1940).
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jured-is the same dominant mission which controls its charitable competitors.
Therefore, healthcare alliances are, for instance, less difficult to justify than a
joint venture between an art museum and a commercial art retail gallery where
the motivation to educate squarely confronts the art dealer's profit motive.
Adhering to charitable objectives is admittedly an important "deal point" in all
affiliation and conversion transactions. But the issue is usually the quantity of
resources to commit, not the commitment itself.
B. The Business Justification for Affiliations, Sales, and Conversion
Organizations seek to affiliate for a variety of reasons, such as administra-
tive efficiency, combination of markets, combination of complementary servic-
es, and that ephemeral term, "synergy." What has fueled the incredible drive by
non-profit health care organizations to affiliate with their for-profit sisters is all
of the above, plus, most importantly, the need for capital.7 Conversion from
non-profit to for-profit status and total asset sales are just stages along a contin-
uum, more or less, driving to these same objectives.'
The current wave of affiliations and conversions can largely be traced to
the early 1980's when many non-profit health maintenance organizations
("HMOs"), formed under the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,'
began to lose their government subsidies. They needed capital from sales of
stock or other market sources. "Affiliations" by these struggling charitable
HMOs usually resulted in total conversions or sales to for-profit organizations.
To the extent that early HMOs needed capital, they looked to membership fees
and conventional, asset-based lending. Originally, Congress provided loans and
grants for HMOs. When those sources of funds were eliminated, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services actively encouraged HMOs to convert
from non-profit to for-profit status." The scale and suddenness of these trans-
actions spawned a mini-flood of litigation which is still ongoing."
Another factor which has contributed to the increase in affiliations, sales,
and conversions is the Tax Reform Act of 1986,12 which limited to 5% the
non-hospital use of bond proceeds and imposed a $150 million total limit on
non-hospital uses." The more favorable tax exempt bond interest rate became
7. See, Douglas Mancino, Converting the Status of Exempt Hospitals and Health Care Organizations, J.
TAx'N OF EXEMPr ORG., July-Aug. 1997, at 16, 17.
8. See generally, R. Todd Greenwalt, Joint Venture, Conversions and Other Transactions Involving
Tax-Exempt and Proprietary Organizations 426, American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys (June 24, 1996)
(presented at the American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys, 29th Annual Meeting) (on file with author).
9. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994)).
10. See, DOUGLAS MANCINO, TAXATION OF HOsPITALS AND HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, § 21.01
(1997).
11. A case in point is Thompson v. Midwest Foundation of Independent Physicians, 117 F.R.D. 108
(S.D. Ohio 1987), in which Choice Care, a Cincinnati-based HMO, attempted to convert to a for-profit entity,
resulting in criminal price fixing, racketeering and conspiracy charges against its officers, who diverted a
million dollars to themselves prior to sale of stock to physicians.
12. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
13. This $150 million cap has recently been repealed in the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997. See 26
U.S.C.A. § 145(b)(5) (Supp. 1997).
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less attractive to non-profit healthcare systems seeking to expand services be-
yond the traditional "bricks and mortar" of hospitals.'4
Since 1983, affiliations and conversions in the health care sector have
multiplied nearly geometrically. Non-profit hospitals merging with or being
acquired by for-profit hospital systems increased from eighteen in 1993 to six-
ty-three in 1996. i" A recent survey commissioned by Grantmakers in Health, a
non-profit industry trade association, shows that there are private foundations
with total assets of $9 billion created as the byproducts of conversions or
sales. 6
The urge to affiliate is not totally one sided. For-profit hospitals also
achieve strategic goals by increasing the size and scope of their prospective
patient market and, hence, their bargaining power with managed care payors. In
addition, for-profits can enjoy the economies of scale and the market prestige
often associated with major non-profit systems and teaching and research insti-
tutions.
I. THE TRADITIONAL NON-PROFrr FORMS, LEVELS, AND VARMTIES OF
AFFILIATIONS
A. The Forms of Non-Profit Organizations in Oklahoma
For-profit business organizations generally fall into one of several catego-
ries: corporations, unincorporated business associations, trusts, partnerships,
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited liability partner-
ships. All of these entities are available to taxable organizations. However, only
corporations, trusts, and possibly limited liability companies are available to
non-profits because of the literal language of IRS Section 501(c)(3) which pro-
vides tax exemption only for "[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund,
or foundation."' 7 Trusts have been interpreted to equate to "funds or founda-
tions."' 8 The limited liability company ("L.L.C."), with the limited liability
attributes of corporations and the federal tax criteria of partnerships, may be an
available form for exempt organizations. But, since the primary motive for
forming a L.L.C. is tax-driven, there seems to- be no compelling reason to orga-
nize a non-profit in L.L.C. form.
The non-profit corporation is generally limited by each state's version of a
specific non-profit corporation act or by features governing non-profit corpora-
tions within the state's general corporation act. Most states have adopted the
Revised Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, but Oklahoma abandoned its sepa-
rate Non-Profit Corporation Act in 1986 when it adopted the General Corpora-
14. See MANCrNO, supra note 10, § 21.01, at 21-25.
15. See Christine Tien, Asset Storm, FOUNDATION NEws AND COMmENTARY, July-Aug. 1997, at 29, 29.
16. See id. at 31. See also, Grantmakers in Health Bulletin of Health Philanthropy, Nov. 3, 1997 (identi-
fying eighty-one conversion foundations, located in thirty states and the District of Columbia).
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
18. Fifth-Third Union Trust Company v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 1932).
[Vol. 33:521
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tion Act.'9 However, non-profit corporations formed in Oklahoma before No-
vember 1, 1997, arguably were governed by the dissolution mandate of the
former Non-Profit Corporation Act because of the provision in the General
Corporation Act stating that "all rights of action conferred, and all duties, re-
strictions, liabilities and penalties imposed or required by and pursuant to laws
enacted prior to the adoption or amendment of the Oklahoma General Corpora-
tion Act, shall not be impaired, diminished or affected." The formerly appli-
cable section of the Non-Profit Corporation Act provided:
Upon the dissolution of the corporation, the Board of Trustees shall, after
paying or making provision for the payment of all the liabilities of the
corporation, dispose of all the assets of the corporation exclusively for the
purposes of the corporation in such manner, or to such organization or or-
ganizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational,
religious, literary or scientific purposes as shall at the time qualify as an
exempt organization or organizations under Section 501(c)(3) ... as the
Board of Trustees shall determine.2'
Thus, for all Oklahoma non-profit corporations formed prior to November 1,
1997, their charitable purposes cannot be exstinguished.
Another feature of Oklahoma corporate law prohibits private gain, like the
so-called private inurement prohibition under 501(c)(3). An Oklahoma non-
profit corporation must provide in its Certificate of Incorporation "that the
corporation does not afford pecuniary gain, incidentally or otherwise, to its
members." Another minor intrusion on the freedom of non-profit corpora-
tions provides that, upon dissolution, the corporation must publish this fact one
time in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in which its princi-
pal place of business is located, which must then be filed with the Secretary of
State2
One final provision of the Act restricts corporate power by limiting merger
of a non-profit into a for-profit, a rare occurrence and a restriction that can
easily be planned around:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the merger of a
charitable nonstock corporation into a stock corporation, if the charitable
status of such nonstock corporation would thereby be lost or impaired; but
a stock corporation may be merged into a charitable nonstock corporation
which shall continue as the surviving corporation.24
These corporation law restrictions on non-profits, taken as a whole, put
Oklahoma generally in line with other states. Non-profit corporate assets are
19. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1001-1144 (1986 & Supp. 1997).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (repealed 1997). This savings feature was repealed effective November
1, 1997. Even though newly formed Oklahoma non-profit corporations are no longer required to dissolve
pursuant to the Non-Profit Corporation Act restrictions, common law considerations, borrowed from the law
of charitable trusts, still apply. See infra text accompanying notes 25-34.
21. OKLA. STAT. tt. 18, § 864 (1981) (repealed 1986).
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006(A)(7)(a) (1986 & Supp. 1997).
23. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1097 (1986 & Supp. 1997).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1086(F) (1986 & Supp. 1997).
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preserved on termination and merger, and private pecuniary gain is prohibited.
As case law develops in Oklahoma in this area of affiliations and conver-
sions, it will most likely derive from the common law of charitable trusts.
Indeed, the line between non-profit corporation law and charitable trusts is
indistinct. The California case of Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, is
illustrative. The court noted that:
the assets of a [non-profit charitable corporation] must be deemed to be
impressed with a charitable trust by virtue of the express declaration of
the corporation's purposes, and notwithstanding the absence of any ex-
press declaration by those who contribute such assets as to the purpose for
which the contributions are made. . . It follows that... [a non-profit
corporation cannot] legally divert its assets to any purpose other than
charitable purposes."
One legal commentator has even suggested that the law from both sources,
whether derived from corporate statutes or the law of trusts, is virtually inter-
changeableYz
Trusts are the traditional vehicle for dispensing charitable goods and ser-
vices. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a charitable trust as "a fidu-
ciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose."
In addition, Oklahoma is one of eight states implementing the Uniform
Trusts Act.29 Under this Uniform Act, a trust can be created either orally or in
writing whenever there is "[a] transfer inter vivos by the owner of property to
another person as trustee for the transferor or for a third person."3 Another
even more expansive and elusive definition of trust is "[a] promise by one
person to another person whose rights thereunder are to be held in trust for a
third person."'3 Both of these provisions are written broadly enough to infuse
the law of trusts into the law of non-profit corporations in Oklahoma. A non-
profit corporation is merely the form of business arrangement through which
charitable fiduciary duties are exercised. An Oklahoma case which inferentially
supports this proposition32 is Sarkeys v. Independent School District No. 40.11
In Sarkeys, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied common law charitable trust
principles to the conduct and affairs of a non-profit corporation without com-
ment or apparent challenge by any party.34 This was an important "leap of
faith" by the court because the law of charitable trusts was used to support
25. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
26. Id. at 39 (quoting Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953)).
27. See Michael W. Peregine, Charitable Trust Laws and the Evolving Nature of the Non-Profit Hospital
Corporation, JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND HosPrrAL LAw, March 1997, at 11.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §348 (1959).
29. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 175.1 to .23 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.6(B) (1994).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.6(E) (1994).
32. See discussion infra Part IV(B).
33. 592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979).
34. See generally id.
[Vol. 33:521
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authority of the Oklahoma Attorney General to intervene in a purely private
corporate, non-profit transaction with no express statutory authorization.
The common law doctrine of cy pres is also applicable here. Under cy
pres, when a charitable purpose becomes impossible, inexpedient, or impractica-
ble of fulfillment or already accomplished, a court will permit the trustees or
board to substitute another charitable object which approaches the original pur-
pose as closely as possible." This doctrine is well established in Oklahoma. In
In re Nuckols' Estate,' the court's holding emphasized the two bases for ap-
proving a change of beneficiary from the grantor's original instruction: (1)
impracticability of carrying out the grantor's explicit intent; and (2) identifica-
tion of a charity with a similar purpose, creed, or mission.37 The cy pres doc-
trine may not be invoked merely on the grounds that it would be more fair,
equitable, or efficient to spend trust funds in a manner different from that speci-
fied by the original creator. The application of cy pres to the healthcare transac-
tions under consideration is obvious. A sale or conversion must simply shift
charitable assets (e.g., residual cash) to a new charity with similar goals and
objectives.
In summary, Oklahoma courts will, if called upon, intervene to limit and
control the way non-profit corporations and charitable trusts use and dispose of
their assets. Anticipating such intervention, it is appropriate to examine the
forms which such affiliations, sales, and conversions usually take.
B. Forms of Affiliations, Sales, and Conversions
Affiliations, sales, and conversions have and will continue to take a num-
ber of different forms depending on the complexity of the transaction and goals
of the participants. Certain patterns have begun to emerge among healthcare
transactional specialists.
1. Partnerships, L.L.C.s, and Corporations
The vast majority of healthcare joint venture affiliations fall into one of
these categories. A partnership is two or more persons (or entities) engaged in
a business for profit." A limited liability company ("L.L.C.") is a product of
statute, having members instead of shareholders and governed by an operating
agreement rather than bylaws. A corporation in Oklahoma has a long and well-
established tradition bringing together shareholders governed by directors and
under the executive authority of officers. Partners, L.L.C. members, and share-
holders themselves can be exempt or taxable organizations. The new entity
itself will not qualify as a non-profit since one or more of its participants antici-
35. See BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 431 (2d ed. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
36. 184 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1947).
37. See id. at 780.
38. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, § 206(1) (1991).
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pate a profit. However, the ultimate objective (i.e., to engage in a business for a
profit) does not per se destroy the charitable status of the non-profit participant.
As shown in Part IV(A) hereafter, such was not always the case.
2. Lease
Healthcare affiliations are often created by lease of real'or personal proper-
ty, especially for long terms, such as ten to fifteen years. Through a lease, a
for-profit entity can pay a fair market value rental for the purpose of managing
and operating a non-profit corporation. Charitable corporations and trusts own
substantial real property with healthcare-related facilities constructed on these
sites. Turning them into essentially passive investment assets to generate rental
income in furtherance of charitable purposes is a proper form of affiliation.39
This arrangement would not be appropriate if the non-profit, in essence, leased
its entire operation to a for-profit receiving a fixed rental in return for surrender
of the net earnings of the non-profit operation.
3. Joint Operating Agreement
A joint operating agreement has the characteristics of a lease and manage-
ment agreement. Real and/or personal property is operated for the benefit of a
non-profit entity frequently with net income payable to the operator. These
arrangements are sui generis. No two are alike. If the operator is to receive full
use of net income, impermissible private inurement will result. There is more
opportunity to structure operating agreements between or among non-profits.
4. Management Agreement
On the surface, a management agreement establishes nothing more than an
agency relationship between a non-profit and a for-profit as its agent. If a non-
profit hires a for-profit management company, in most instances the relationship
will not implicate tax exemption. In the health care area, management compa-
nies commonly "manage' a large number of non-profit hospitals throughout the
country for a specific management fee without raising any question as to the
continuing exemption of those hospitals.
5. Asset Purchase, Conversion, and Merger
Asset purchases, conversions, and mergers are the dominant form of trans-
action on which most of the recent legal activity has focused. These
transactions involve the extinction or abandonment of a non-profit for consider-
ation, usually cash. Conversions occur when a charitable corporation amends its
bylaws to eliminate the non-profit restrictions. Title to assets does not change.
39. Unrelated business income tax ("UB1T") is always an underlying concern. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(1)
(1994). In most instances, the same criteria which support change of use of charitable assets also ensure that
the income produced by the new affiliated entity is sufficiently related to the non-profit so as to avoid UBiT.
[Vol. 33:521
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Ordinarily, healthcare licenses remain in place. Mergers are exclusively corpo-
rate transactions governed by statute.' Asset sales involve transfer of tangible
and intangible assets to a for-profit company usually for cash. The cash consid-
eration cannot be diverted to private individuals. A charitable 501(c)(3) founda-
tion, supporting organization or new operating charitable organization must be
formed with the residual cash as its primary asset." The non-profit's assets,
good will, and future revenue become the sole property of a for-profit enter-
prise. Typically, the non-profit will cease to operate but a new non-profit will
use the cash as a private foundation or a public charity. The planning options
all have to be measured against the requirements of 501(c)(3) and state law
applicable to charitable trusts.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND PLANNING CRITERIA IMPOSED BY IRS RULES AND
STATE COMMON LAW RESTRICrIONS
A. Preserving the Federal Tax Exemption
The requirements for federal tax exemption under 501(c)(3) are, simply stated:
(1) The organization must be organized and operated exclusively for cer-
tain exempt purposes;
(2) No part of the organization's net earnings may inure to the benefit of
a private shareholder or individual;
(3) No part of the organization's activities may constitute intervention or
participation in a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office; and
(4) No substantial part of the organization's activities may consist of
attempts to influence legislation.42
Only the first two requirements are relevant to our present discussion.
1. The Tax Exemption Consequences of Affiliations.
Prior to 1982, the IRS recognized no opportunity for planning to insulate
the non-profit from its for-profit partners' business activities and objectives.43
Various Private Letter Rulings and the case of Better Business Bureau v. United
States' combined to create a per se prohibition against non-profit/for-profit
partnerships, or other joint venture business associates. Such an affiliation
would destroy the exempt status of the non-profit participant. This was the
40. See OKLA. STAT. tiL 18, § 1081 (1986 & Supp. 1998).
41. See discussion infra Part lV(A)(2) (discussing the rules governing the ongoing operation of these
residual entities).
42. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
43. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-20-058 (Feb. 17, 1998). See also, Gen. Couns. Mer. 36293 (May 30, 1975).
44. 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
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IRS's. position until Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner.45 In
Plumstead Theatre, a non-profit theatre company entered into a limited partner-
ship as general partner with three for-profit limited partner investors to raise
revenue to produce a play.' The United States Tax Court held, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affinmed, that the exempt status of the non-profit
would be maintained, essentially because the transaction was made at arm's
length and reasonable consideration was paid; the theatre company had no obli-
gation to return capital to the limited partners; the limited partners had little or
no control; there was no profit motive by the non-profit; and none of the limit-
ed partners representatives were controlling or managing partners.47
The IRS officially adopted the Plumstead Theatre approach, slightly modi-
fied, in its General Counsel Memorandum ("GCM") 39,005 (the so-called
"close scrutiny" test).4 Under GCM 39,005, three considerations are para-
mount to preserve the tax exempt status of the participating non-profit. First,
the joint venture must further the non-profit's exempt purposes.49 The new
organization must provide a community benefit. Its purpose must not be primar-
ily to increase an exempt hospital's market share. There must be evidence that
bona fide community benefit is the principal purpose of the venture." Second,
the non-profit participant must be able to act (especially if it is a general partner
or manager) free of any conflict of interest.5' The non-profit must not be re-
quired to act primarily to further the private financial interests of its non-exempt
partners. 2 Finally, the joint venture structure must protect against the non-ex-
empt participants from deriving improper financial gain from the venture.53 As
long as the governing structure provides earnings in each participant's propor-
tionate share of ownership or capital investment, then the transaction should be
acceptable. This standard applies both at the outset when initial capital contribu-
tions are made and on an ongoing basis as additional capital calls are required.
These criteria do not create insurmountable barriers to joint venture affiliations
but require careful planning and drafting. Unless the transaction fits squarely
within an existing Private Letter Ruling or GCM, a new Private Letter Ruling
request is advisable.
The IRS has further analyzed the role of the non-profit as general, control-
ling partner.' The IRS reaffirmed its position that a tax-exempt organization
could carry out its fiduciary duty to other partners to maximize profits and at
the same time be operated exclusively for charitable purposes.5 The trend,
45. 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982), affg 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
46. See id. at 244.
47. See Plumstead Theatre, 74 T.C. at 1333-34 (affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Plumstead Theatre, 675
F.2d at 245).
48. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (Dec. 17, 1982).
49. See id.
50. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991).
51. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (Dec. 17, 1982).
52. See Gen. Couns. Mere. 37,852 (Feb. 15, 1979).
53. See Gen. Couns. Mer. 39,005 (Dec. 17, 1982).




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss2/3
1997] HEALTHCARE AFFILIATIONS, SALES, AND CONVERSIONS 531
therefore, continues to favor these affiliations.
Since GCM 39,005, numerous Private Letter Rulings have been issued
authorizing non-profit/for-profit joint ventures. The elements and purposes of
a joint venture which will support a finding of continuing tax-exemption are
suggested in GCM 39,862 when the venture (1) creates a new health care pro-
vider, service, or resources; (2) raises capital for exempt purposes projects; (3)
owns or leases a facility; (4) pools expertise; or (5) measurably improves quali-
ty of careYs However, all of these purposes and features will avail nothing if
the non-profit surrenders control as a minority participant with a dominant for-
profit co-venturer. 8
2. The Tax Exemption Consequences of Conversions and Sales of Assets
In the case of outright sales or conversions rather than ongoing business
affiliations, the question becomes: Will the new or surviving non-profit which
receives the sales proceeds operate in a manner allowing it to obtain and retain
tax exemption? There are several options open: (1) continued public charity
status; (2) supporting organization; and (3) private foundation. Each option
requires its own planning criteria.
When a 501(c)(3) organization converts to a for-profit enterprise, it loses
its public charity status. However, if the non-profit sells its assets, it still has
the option of remaining in existence and continuing to function with a newly-
acquired asset base (i.e., cash). If the old or spinoff non-profit seeks avoidance
of private foundation status, with its attendant complications, it must continue
to provide a measurable amount of healthcare services 9
If continuing charitable services cannot or will not be provided, the residu-
al non-profit entity can attempt to qualify for tax exemption as a supporting
organization.' This allows the non-profit to continue as a financial resource
without the restrictions imposed by private foundation status.
Finally, and most commonly, a private foundation is set up to support
other 501(c)(3) organizations. The requirements for maintaining private founda-
tion tax exempt status are beyond the scope of this article. The most restrictive,
however, is the minimum payout requirement. Under federal statutes, these
organizations must distribute at least 5% of the aggregate fair market value of
all foundation assets annually to qualified charitable donees.6" This presents a
challenge for investment strategy and serious problems for foundations which
are funded with illiquid sales consideration. Despite the private foundation
limitations on operation, this appears to be the conversion and sale entity
56. See Priv. Ltr. Rul 93-23-030 (June 11, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-19-004 (May 14, 1993); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-37-050 (Sept. 13, 1996).
57. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991).
58. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (Sept. 5, 1997).
59. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994) establishes the requirements for public charity status for hospitals.
60. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (1994) provides tax exemption for an organization which supports another
509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) organization.
61. See I.R.C. § 4942 (1994).
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choice. The size of these conversion foundations alone virtually guarantees
intensive community and state interest as discussed in the following section.62
B. The State's Role in Supervising Affiliations, Sales, and Conversions
Although there is no expressed statutory authority, the Oklahoma Attorney
General has the power and duty, under the common law, to enforce charitable
trusts or prevent their misuse.63
In Sarkeys v. Independent School District No. 40,'4 a charitable corpora-
tion, Sarkeys Foundation sold a large block of stock in Sarkeys, Inc., an oil and
gas company, back to Sarkeys, Inc.'s Both the foundation and the purchasing
company shared certain common directors.' At the request of a Cleveland
County school district, the lead class plaintiff on behalf of a class of Sarkeys
Foundation beneficiaries, the Oklahoma Attorney General intervened in a suit
the beneficiaries brought to challenge the transaction as a self-dealing breach of
fiduciary duty.67 The case was settled, and the Attorney General approved the
settlement based on a sales price of $14.5 million.s The standing and authority
of the Attorney General were challenged by certain Sarkeys family members.69
The court supported the Attorney General's standing and authority to inter-
vene, citing the prerogative of the state, as parens patriae, to supervise charita-
ble trusts.70 Further, this authority is exclusive except as to grantors, trustees,
and actual or potential beneficiaries.7' In other words, citizen action generally
cannot be maintained. "If a third party were permitted to sue as a matter of
right, the charity could be subjected to frequent, unreasonable and vexatious
litigation, the court dockets could become clogged, and the trust assets could be
wasted in unnecessary attorney fees." Armed with this authority, what stan-
dards exists for the Attorney General to enforce?
As stated previously, the Oklahoma Trust Act defines "trust" broadly
enough to encompass arrangements that are obviously trusts and those that may
appear to be something else.' For example, the law in other jurisdictions has
developed, and Oklahoma would not contradict the trend, to the extent that
corporations are deemed to be charitable trusts. To protect charitable interests,
courts typically do not make fine distinctions. In Queen of Angels Hospital v.
62. The five largest conversion foundations are: California HealthCare Foundation, Oakland, CA, $2.2
billion; California Endowment, Woodland Hills, CA, $975 million; California Wellness Foundation, Wood-
land Hills, CA, $880 million; Kansas Health Foundation, Wichita, KS, $377 million; Colorado Trust, Denver,
CO, $320 million. See Meyer, supra note 3.
63. See Sarkeys v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 40, 592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979).
64. 592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979).
65. See id. at 532.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 532 n.3.
69. See id. at 532-33.
70. See id. at 533.
71. See i.
72. Id. at 534.
73. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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Younger,74 the court entered a declaratory judgment that the articles of incor-
poration of Queen of Angels Hospital in Los Angeles prevented abandonment
of hospital activity in favor of out-patient medical clinics.! Similarly, in Holt
v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons,76 the original articles of
incorporation called for creation of an osteopathic college. A majority of the
board voted to allow for allopathic and osteopathic medical education.78 Three
dissenting trustees brought an action to prevent the breach of a charitable
trust." The court held that the change amounted to a significant departure
from the original purpose and prevented the modification." By contrast, in
Taylor v. Baldwin,8 the court held that there was no substantial departure from
original intent when the University of Washington Medical Center affiliated
with a for-profit cancer treatment facility.'
In the governing documents, whether creating a trust or a corporation,
certain ground rules apply before the charitable purposes can be changed. First,
the process of sale or conversion must be free of conflicts of interest. Sweet-
heart deals involving trustees or key administrators, "golden parachute con-
tracts"-all are highly suspect. Second, the trustees must exercise sound busi-
ness judgment. Affiliations are appropriate for any number of strategic purpos-
es. However, the governing board must enter into a sale or conversion only out
of absolute necessity. Typically, conversion or sale is necessary to keep the
organization, or the needed service, in existence. These are life-or-death busi-
ness judgments. Reliance on legal counsel and qualified appraisals is also high-
ly recommended. Third, the conversion must not involve a change of use dra-
matically different from the original corporate purpose.
Most health care conversions will satisfy the cy pres doctrine. If the residu-
ary non-profit or foundation created to receive converted funds makes grants or
otherwise assists in the promotion of health care in the community, the change
of corporate purpose will not destroy the transaction. One can, however, ques-
tion the activities of surviving conversion foundations which have a broad and
diverse public mission, providing benefits to education and the arts, as well as
health services.
Finally, the most important question is what use will be made of the sales
or conversion proceeds? The dollars involved in these transactions are usually
so large and the change of ownership so significant for communities, even
statewide interests, that Attorneys General have taken a very active role. The
National Association of Attorneys General and the National Association of State
Charity Officials have organized an Internet linkage to assist each other in
74. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
75. See id. at 41.
76. 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
77. See id. at 937.
78. See id. at 938.
79. See id. at 934.
80. See id. at 938.
81. 247 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. 1952).
82. See id. at 751-52.
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examining and intervening in conversions. 3
As the states' attorneys general continue to intervene and scrutinize con-
versions, the focus may shift from the propriety of the conversion itself to the
use made of the proceeds. States can be expected to insist upon greater support
for indigent care and basic hospital services rather than more exotic and lucra-
tive healthcare "products." In addition, the states can be expected to demand
community participation and control over use of the residual resources. The
amount of negotiating leverage available to the Attorneys General will depend
on-the strength and explicitness of state law. Oklahoma's law-statutory and
common law-does not currently provide a significant platform for intervention.
The instances of sale or conversion have produced no definite pattern.
State interventions have generally served as roadblocks or detours in transac-
tions resulting in settlements arguably more favorable to the public interest.
A few of the more notable transactions recently occurring in other states
are:
(1) Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Georgia. Nine consumer groups have sued
the Georgia Insurance Commissioner and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Geor-
gia, Inc., to recoup $400 million dollars from private investors after a leg-
islatively-authorized conversion. Plaintiffs claim the legislation was un-
constitutional.'
(2) Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas-Illinois Merger. The Texas Attor-
ney General has sued to enjoin a merger with BC/BS of Illinois, a con-
verted for-profit, claiming this would divert $700 million in charitable
assets from the state.'
(3) Good Samaritan Health System-sale to Columbia/HCA. The Califor-
nia attorney general insists that $72 million proceeds from sale to Colum-
bia/HCA be maintained for acute care hospital services for indigents rath-
er than medical residency scholarships.'
(4) In Kelly v. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare System, Inc.," the trial
court held that a fifty/fifty joint venture between an non-profit healthcare
system and Columbia/HCA would violate the Michigan Non-Profit Corpo-
ration Act, which prevents "co-mingling" of non-profit and for-profit as-
sets. This deal involved the entire hospital system co-venturing with a for-
profit.
These cases are undoubtedly expensive, time consuming, and contentious and
do not represent creative teamwork between the public and private sectors.
83. See Non-Profit Conversions: State AGs Share Data, Approaches to Charitable Assets Conversions, 5
BNA'S HEALTH L. REP. 1413 (1996).
84. See Consumer Groups Sue to Recover Assets Retained by Blue Cross of Georgia, 6 BNA's HEALTH
L. REP. 1378 (1997).
85. See State Asks Court to Block Texas-Illinois Blues Merger, 6 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1181 (1997).
86. See Michele B. Blecher, Show Us the Money, HosprrmS AND HEALTH NmWORS, June 20, 1997, at
52.
87. No. 96-83848 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996).
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VI. GOVERNMENTAL AND QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS IN OKLAHOMA MAY AFFiLIATE OR COMMIT THEIR
OPERATIONS TO FOR-PROFIT VENTURES
Oklahoma, like most states, has public sector organizations created to
deliver healthcare services. These facilities which are owned, operated, or spon-
sored by the state, are not-for-profit and tax exempt; but they do not derive
their charitable status from corporate or trust law or 501(c)(3). Rather, they are
created expressly under statutory authority. Like private charitable organiza-
tions, however, these creatures of state law are also seeking for-profit partner-
ships and conversions.
A. Public Trusts
The most commonly encountered statutory healthcare entity is the public
trust formed for the benefit of the state, a county, or a municipality."8 Public
trusts are formed primarily as entities authorized to issue bonds.89 Hospital
construction in Oklahoma was greatly assisted in the immediate post war era by
funds available under the federal Hill-Burton Act.' As those funds became
less accessible, many Oklahoma hospitals in smaller cities and towns turned to
hospital bond issuance to finance expansion, modernization, new equipment,
and services.' Following final payment or early refunding of such bonds, the
public trust remains as a quasi-governmental entity with its distinct governing
trust indenture, bylaws, and board of trustees. In many respects, these hospitals
function as agencies of the state. For example, the Oklahoma Public Meeting
and Records Acts applies to their deliberations and documents.' However,
their revenues and assets are not controlled by Article X, Section 15 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, which prohibits the State of Oklahoma from entering
into any for-profit venture. Section 15 states:
The credit of the State shall not be given, pledged or loaned to any indi-
vidual, company, corporation or association, municipality or political
subdivision of the State; nor shall the State become an owner or stock-
holder in, nor make donation by gift, subscription to stock, by tax, or
otherwise to any company, association or corporation.93
In Sublett v. City of Tulsa,9 4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
public trust could lease the Port of Catoosa, Oklahoma, storage and docking
88. Such public trusts are formed pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176 (Supp. 1998).
89. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(a) (Supp. 1998).
90. Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act) of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, ch. 958, 60
Stat. 1040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 24 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 46
U.S.C., 48 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
91. Examples include hospital trust authorities in Cushing, Cleveland, Poteau, Henryetta, and Pryor.
92. See Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-109 (1981).
93. OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 15.
94. 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965).
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facilities to private entities.' Article X, Section 15 of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion was not violated because the lease did not involve pledging the state's
credit or appropriating money for a private enterprise." The pivotal issue was
whether the "public" property was to be used for a private purpose. The court
found the purpose consistent with public ownershipY
The tendency of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to measure the degree of
continued public use and benefit is highlighted by the more recent case of
Burkhardt v. City of Enid.98 The City of Enid bought Phillips University, a
private facility, and transferred it to the Enid Economic Development Authority
("EEDA"), a public trusty The EEDA then leased the university to a private
foundation."° The lease provided only nominal rental to the public trust, thus
suggesting that the public trust had made a "gift," unconstitutional under Article
X, Section 15. However, transfer of assets at less than fair market value did
not diminish the effect of continued public use and benefit."°
B. The University Hospitals Trust Authority! HCA Joint Operating Agreement
A notable recent conversion of a public trust involves the healthcare sys-
tem operated by the University Hospital Authority ("Authority")-University
Hospital, Children's Hospital of Oklahoma, the Child Study Center and the
O'Donoghue Rehabilitation Institute. The Authority is a public trust which
controls the University Hospitals, formerly a state agency. In a complex transac-
tion, recently upheld by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as valid," HCA
Health Service of Oklahoma, Inc., a subsidiary of the giant, for-profit hospital
company, Columbia-HCA, Inc., now operates the University Hospitals governed
by the Authority. HCA has paid in excess of $40 million dollars for these long-
term, and potentially financially lucrative, operating assets sanctioned by special
legislation.Y Under the Joint Operating Agreement, the mission and purpose
of the University Hospitals are realized. A Governing Committee, comprised of
balanced representation from the governmental side and the for-profit side will
establish long range policy and make certain defined major decisions. Day to
95. See id. at 201-02.
96. See id at 204.
97. See id. If the public trust facility has issued tax exempt bonds, the change of use caused by a lease
to a for-profit facility would have to be carefully analyzed.
98. 771 P.2d 608 (Okla. 1989).
99. See id. at 609-10.
100. See id. at 611.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 611-12.
103. See In re Petition of Univ. Hosp. Trust Auth., No. 90-212, 1997 WL 819439 (Okla. 1997).
104. See University Hospitals Authority Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3201-27.1 (1997 & Supp. 1998). The
Act empowers the Authority to "maintain, use and operate or to contract for the maintenance, use and opera-
tion of or lease of any and all property of any kind, real, personal, or mixed or any interest therein." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, § 3208(B)(9) (1997). In a 1997 amendment to the Act, agreements such as the HCA Joint Oper-
ating Agreement must be reviewed by a Contingency Review Board. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3225(A)
(Supp. 1998). If approved (which did occur in the HCA deal), the Authority may file a petition with the Okla-
homa Supreme Court seeking a declaratory judgment in favor of the transaction. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 3225(B) (Supp. 1998).
(Vol. 33:521
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss2/3
1997] HEALTHCARE AFFILIATIONS, SALES, AND CONVERSIONS 537
day operations will be the responsibility of HCA. HCA will pay rental/operating
consideration from net earnings but will initially receive and own all the reve-
nue. Certain side agreements requiring various levels of indigent care, medical
education, and student and faculty health services are also part of the transac-
tion.
The Authority filed its mandatory declaratory judgment action in the Okla-
homa Supreme Court seeking a preclusive judgment of: (1) the appropriateness
of the HCA transaction, and (2) the constitutionality of the transaction under
Article X, Section 15.2'5 The briefing in support and opposition"° focused
on the degree of public benefit preserved or enhanced. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the transaction was "not in discord with the [University Hospi-
tals Authority] Act and other Oklahoma law.""° The court refrained from en-
joining all future challenges, however, stating: "It is impossible to say what
circumstances not evident from the record before us today might arise at some
future time that would expose a critical infirmity in the Transaction.' ' . 8
Public trust and state agency healthcare facilities are creatures of statute.
However, their freedom to affiliate, sell or convert to for-profit entities is sub-
ject to much the same policy standards applicable to private 501(c)(3) corpora-
tions or trusts. The pressure of healthcare change is stronger than the tradition
and public perception of an impregnable wall between public and private enter-
prise.
VII. CoNCLuSION
Taxable and non-taxable organizations can affiliate successfully and
for obvious mutual advantage. The tax exemption of the non-profit venturer and
its parent and affiliates can and should be maintained. The IRS has become
familiar with and tolerant of these transactions if properly structured to protect
the exempt purposes of the non-profit. Conversions and sales also are permissi-
ble under tax law, with the greater scrutiny on the operations of the surviving
non-profit entity or foundation. Oklahoma, through its Attorney General, can
and will continue to intervene to protect charitable assets. Oklahoma has suffi-
cient corporate statutory and trust common law to enable these transactions to
occur in a relatively favorable environment. The litigation spawned in other
jurisdictions has thus far (blessedly) not made its way to Oklahoma. There is no
reason why, under the existing regulatory system, Oklahoma's experience can-
not be less contentious, thus saving precious charitable resources for more bene-
ficial uses.
105. This unusual procedure was specifically created under the Act which provides for exclusive, original
jurisdiction in the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3225(B)(1) (Supp. 1998).
106. Opposition surfaced from Common Cause of Oklahoma, the N.A.A.C.P. (Oklahoma City Branch),
and Oklahoma Coalition for Health Security, arguing, in essence, that the entire transaction amounted to an
unconstitutional "donation" of public property to a private corporation.
107. Petition of Univ. Hosp., 1997 WL 819439, at *3.
108. Id. at *6.
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